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   Kiev is not so far away from Brussels as one 
might expect. Ukraine already performs quite well 
when compared to the other countries in the 
queue for entry into the EU. Especially the fiscal 
and external debt figures are better than in other 
countries. On the negative side, there is a con-
siderable backlog with respect to the development 
of administrative and judicial institutional capaci-
ties, and a potential for macroeconomic instability 
due to monetary expansion, rising inflation rates, 
and real exchange rate instability.  
  From a macro perspective, the most pressing issue 
is to end inflationary pressures resulting from tar-
geting the exchange rate to a weakening dollar. 
Among the alternative frameworks available to 
Ukraine, the current exchange rate anchor can be 
made more flexible by targeting a basket made of 
the US dollar and the euro. Such an exchange rate 
anchor framework provides a clear indication to 
the public about monetary policy, disciplines fis-
cal policy, and is relatively easy to manage. Ad-
ditionally, a clearer link to the euro may be useful 
for a greater integration into the EU. 
  From a micro perspective, the most pressing is-
sues which can be targeted in the short run are 
taxation and competition policy. The tax system is 
unstable, complex, and inconsistent. A reduction 
of tax exemptions could broaden the tax base and 
allow for lower nominal tax rates. Privatization 
has been rather limited in the non-traded goods 
sectors. Additionally, the completion of privatiza-
tion needs to be coupled with a more robust and 
consistent regulatory framework in order to attract 
more FDI, as was the case in the new member 
states of the EU. 
  Sandwiched between the EU and Russia, Ukraine 
is likely to derive substantial gains from EU inte-
gration. Excluding the energy sector reveals that 
Ukrainian trade with the EU already outperforms 
its trade with Russia. In addition, EU integration 
is likely to attract more inflows of foreign capital 
if the new government is able to provide a more 
attractive macroeconomic and institutional en-
vironment.  
  Ukraine should press for fast reforms and use the 
“honeymoon” period of the new government to 
open negotiations for EU membership by sub-
mitting a formal application. This will, among 
other things, help to prevent vested interest 
groups from blocking the reform process. A prag-
matic approach for an integration strategy would 
include four elements: identifying reform priori-
ties; harmonizing Ukraine’s legislation with EU 
law; undertaking steps to get a market economy 
status from the EU; and, finally, signing a free 
trade agreement with the EU. 
  The EU, on its side, should actively support the 
continuation of the reform process in the country, 
especially with respect to institution building. 
Finally, one must stress that the EU itself will 
gain from this enlargement, as it has gained from 
all the previous ones. In our view both sides are 
now facing a historic opportunity that should not 
be missed, neither by Kiev nor by Brussels. 
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After several months of political conflict, a new 
leadership was elected in Ukraine in late 2004. 
Viktor Yushchenko’s Presidential Inauguration 
took place in Kiev on January 23, 2005. This 
election followed months of high drama, do-
mestic strife, and different degrees of external 
involvement, but is also perceived as a harbinger 
of change and hope, after the 10-year-long gov-
ernment of Leonid Kuchma. 
Since 1996, Ukraine repeatedly has stated its 
intention to become a member of the European 
Union (EU). So far, the EU has shown little en-
thusiasm towards a potential Ukraine’s member-
ship, with even rather dispiriting statements by 
some EU officials,1 while the Ukrainian govern-
ment itself has shown a rather limited commit-
ment to actually introduce the necessary reforms 
to achieve such a stated goal: Kuzio (2003) aptly 
describes the EU–Ukrainian relationship as a 
virtual one. 
With not only a new, more Western-oriented 
government in Kiev, but with an enlarged Euro-
pean Union with 25 member states—several of 
them with a direct stake in a prosperous and 
stable Ukraine—and long direct borders with the 
former Soviet Union, the moment to seriously 
reassess a potential Ukrainian membership has 
arrived. The aim of this paper is to analyse such 
a possibility, as is our view that both sides are 
now facing a historic opportunity that should not 
be missed, neither by Kiev nor by Brussels. 
1.1  Ukraine after Independence: A Brief 
Review 
Ukraine only decided to opt for independence 
from the late Soviet Union after the August 1991 
attempted coup by anti-reformists in Moscow: 
before that Ukraine had a very limited ex-
perience with a national governance (the first 
national government in Ukraine was formed in 
____________________ 
1 Probably, the most (in)famous is the one made by the pre-
vious President of the European Commission (EC), Romano 
Prodi, to the populist Dutch newspaper Die Volkskrant on 
27 November 2003. 
1917, but the country lost sovereignty several 
years later). One must remember that such a lim-
ited experience with nationhood, far from being 
unique to Ukraine, is mirrored by several of the 
new EU member states (for this group we will 
use the acronym NMS throughout the paper to 
indicate the nations that entered the Union in 
May 2004): the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia either were 
only created as national entities during the 1990s, 
or had very limited previous nationhood ex-
periences. 
The Ukrainian independence movement was 
led by a member of the former Ukrainian Com-
munist Party (UCP), Leonid Kravchuk, who be-
came the first elected president of this new po-
litical entity. The early independence years were 
occupied by the creation of national institutions 
and by a limited attempt to assure macro stabi-
lization. The limited progress in this last front led 
to a call for change, and Mr. Kravchuk agreed to 
early parliamentary and presidential elections in 
1994. Leonid Kuchma, who had served briefly as 
prime minister under Mr. Kravchuk, defeated the 
incumbent president in the July 1994 election. 
The first Kuchma term (1994–1998) was marked 
by a first serious attempt to macro stabilization 
and by a series of pro-Western overtures.2 Incon-
sistent policies, plus the Russian 1998 crisis, led 
to a resurgence of instability during the early years 
of Mr. Kuchma’s second term (1999–2004), 
which was accompanied by a sharp deterioration 
of its relationship with Western partners—amid 
several allegations of improper behaviour by Mr. 
Kuchma—resulting in some moves that were 
perceived as an overture towards the CIS (Com-
monwealth of Independent States, a rather loose 
organization that includes most of the former   
 
____________________ 
2  Including the signing of a Partnership for Peace with 
NATO: significantly, the linkages of the Ukrainian military 
with its Western counterparts have been considerably more 
consistent than the ones observed in other spheres. Ukraine 
holds a NATO training centre at its Yavoriv military base 
and has already participated in several NATO operations 
(most notably in Kosovo, with the joint Ukrainian-Polish 
Battalion (UKPOLBAT) of KFOR, and in Bosnia; Ukrain-
ian troops are also based in Iraq, again, significantly, under 
the Polish-managed sector in Southern Iraq: there are strong 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and historic ties between Poland 
and Ukraine). 4 
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Source: World Bank WDI. 
members of the Soviet Union) and the Russian 
Federation as a political alternative to the West.3 
The strong return to growth after 1999, ini-
tiated under Mr. Yushchenko’s—governor of the 
Ukrainian central bank, the National Bank of 
Ukraine (NBU), from 1993 to 1999—brief term 
as a Prime Minister, was followed by an increase 
in internal political conflict, which resulted in the 
change in government following the 2004 elec-
tions. 
1.2  Recent Macroeconomic Performance 
1.2.1  The Initial Years of Transition, 1992–
1994: Output Collapse and 
Hyperinflation 
The first years of transition resulted in substan-
tial adjustment costs for Ukraine. This was partly 
due to unfavourable initial conditions: Ukraine 
had one of the highest shares of large-scale in-
termediate goods industrial enterprises of the 
former Soviet Union, highly integrated and de-
pendent on the rest of the USSR economy. 
____________________ 
3 Probably the more peculiar of those moves was the elec-
tion of Mr. Kuchma to chair the CIS Council of Heads of 
State in 2003, given that Ukraine was not a de jure member 
of the CIS, as it never ratified the 1993 CIS Charter. 
Not only this made Ukraine one of the poten-
tially most vulnerable CIS countries4 during the 
beginning of “transition”, but this over-indus-
trialization5 created a domestic industrial lobby 
that at first attempted to delay market-oriented 
reforms and later attempted to capture the state 
and block reforms that were perceived to be 
against its interests (Havrylyshyn 2000). 
As a result of these elements, Ukraine suffered 
one of the largest cumulative declines in output 
among the transition countries (IMF 2004),6 with 
manufacturing output declining by over 60 per cent 
in the first five years of “transition” (Figure 1). 
Monetary and fiscal policies were clearly on 
an unsustainable path during this period: budget 
deficits were close to 10 per cent of GDP (a sub-
stantial part of which was linked to para-fiscal 
operations to support the energy sector, see IMF 
2004). As these deficits were monetized to a 
large extent, they also resulted in inflation, which 
reached almost 5000 per cent in 1993 (Kravchuk 
2002). 
____________________ 
4 At par with Belarus; see Bakanova et al. (2004). 
5  Planned economies were usually estimated to have a 
higher share of industry in GDP than other economies with 
a similar GDP per capita level: this phenomenon was called 
“over-industrialization”. 
6 Note that “over-industrialization” and reliance on Russian 
markets was not always synonymous with large GDP losses, 
even in the absence of mineral endowments, as the case of 
Belarus shows (see Bakanova et al. 2004). 5 
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Source: IMF/IFS and DataStream. 
1.2.2  The First Stabilization Programme and 
the Russian Crisis 
In 1994, during the first Kuchma Presidential 
term, an initial stabilization programme was fi-
nally attempted. Similarly to other adjustment 
programmes in Eastern Europe, it included price 
and import/export liberalization, the unification 
of the exchange rate, some limited fiscal consoli-
dation, and in 1996 the introduction of a national 
currency, the hryvnia, which was linked to the 
US dollar via an exchange rate band of 1.7–1.9 
hryvnia/USD. These measures were successful in 
bringing down inflation from 400 per cent in 
1994 to 10 per cent in 1997. 
Nevertheless, the persistent fiscal deficits were 
incompatible with a fixed exchange rate regime. 
The situation came to a head with contagion 
from the Russian August 1998 crisis. Foreign ex-
change reserves fell to just over a week of im-
ports, forcing the authorities to devalue the 
hryvnia (by more than 50 per cent) and to intro-
duce strict restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions. Inflation briefly increased, but re-






1.2.3  The Second Stabilization Programme: 
Yushchenko’s Mark 1 
In December 1999, Viktor Yushchenko, who in 
his role as a former NBU Governor had built a 
solid reformist reputation during and after the 
1998 crisis, was appointed Prime Minister. He 
moved fast to introduce reforms during his brief 
period in power (he was voted out of office in 
April 2001 by a coalition of “oligarch”7 and Com-
munist parties, after only 16 months in power). 
The recent strong growth resumption in 
Ukraine is considered by most analysts to be 
linked to the fiscal and tax reforms initiated dur-
ing this period, the resumption of growth in 
major CIS markets, and to the devaluations of 
the hryvnia in 1998–99 and its posterior linking 
to the USD.8 Given that most of Ukraine’s ex-
ternal markets are in the euro area, the link to a 
weakening USD implied that the hryvnia con-
tinued to depreciate in real effective terms 
(Figure 3). 
During subsequent years the government con-
tinued its efforts towards hardening budget con-
straints and making the tax system more trans-
____________________ 
7 “Oligarch” is a traditional term used for the entrepreneurs 
that acquired large formerly state-owned assets in the CIS 
countries. 
8  40 per cent of Ukraine’s growth during 1999–2002 is 
linked to trade (World Bank 2004). 6 
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Source: IMF/IFS and DataStream. 
parent (the general government debt ratio was 
more than halved between 1998 and 2004, to 25 
per cent of GDP). As of January 1, 2004, the 
corporate tax rate was reduced from 30 to 25 per 
cent, and a 13 per cent flat tax on personal in-
come was introduced. Previously, the tax base 
had been broadened through a significant reduc-
tion in tax exemptions. In addition, several VAT 
exemptions were eliminated, though these meas-
ures were not always consistent. 
In 2000, a free-floating exchange rate regime 
was introduced (de facto the hryvnia has been 
kept at an almost constant rate with respect to the 
US dollar, by means of foreign exchange market 
interventions). Since 2000, the trade and current 
accounts have shown surpluses, leading to an in-
crease in the money supply, as often the mone-
tary authorities refrained from sterilizing these 
inflows. The main reason behind the lack of ef-
fective sterilization was the lack of sterilization 
instruments and ineffectiveness of NBU rates as 
a monetary policy tool (Bilan 2004). Also, due to 
the success of the stabilization policy, the de-
mand for financial assets increased. This led to 
high growth rates of money supply and a credit 
boom (IMF 2005). To pre-empt potential finan-
cial stability problems, the NBU increased the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio from 8 to 10 per 
cent. 
2  How Far Is Ukraine from 
Brussels? 
2.1  The Current Framework for Rela-
tions between Ukraine and the EU 
Current institutional relations between the EU 
and Ukraine are somewhat limited, albeit the EU 
is not only the largest external donor (since 1991 
total EU assistance has amounted to more than 
1  billion euros) but also the biggest economic 
partner of Ukraine (see next section). 
The current relations are based on the Partner-
ship and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which 
was concluded in 1994 but entered into force 
only in 1998, for an initial period of ten years,9 
and on the EU’s Common Strategy of 1999, 
which lasted until December 2004. Beyond those, 
a number of specific agreements in particular 
policy areas such as trade,10 science and technol-
____________________ 
9 The PCA actually upgraded a previous agreement existing 
since 1990 between the EU and the late Soviet Union. By 
now most of its successor states have signed PCAs with the 
EU. 
10 Trade in textiles between the EC and Ukraine is regu-
lated by a separate agreement, signed in December 2000. It 
covers an alignment of applicable import tariffs and double-
checking arrangements aimed at preventing fraud. This 
agreement expired at the end of 2004, but is likely to be re-
newed. Specific arrangements for bilateral trade in steel also 7 
ogy, and nuclear energy are also in place. Technical 
assistance has been provided since the early 
1990s in support of the transition process towards 
democracy and market economy, through the 
TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Common-
wealth of Independent States and Mongolia) Pro-
gram. 
Although the PCA is wide-ranging (covering 
political dialogue, trade in goods and services, 
and economic, environmental, scientific, cultural, 
and legal matters) and a potentially powerful in-
strument in bringing Ukraine’s domestic legis-
lation into line with the legal framework of the 
EU’s Single Market and of the WTO system, as 
it contains a number of “evolutionary clauses” 
that also include the prospect of establishing a 
free trade area (FTA) with the EU, it is also an 
inherently limited framework for EU–Ukraine 
relations. It does not replace a traditional “Asso-
ciation Agreement” that has EU membership as 
its final aim, nor the tool used to assess progress 
towards EU membership, the “Regular Reports 
on a Candidate Country’s Progress towards Ac-
cession”.11 Therefore, the degree of commitment 
of national authorities towards reform induced by 
those different instruments is not comparable. 
____________________ 
exist: following the expiry of the bilateral agreement on 
trade in steel products that was in place until the end of 
2001, a system of autonomous import quotas to the EU ap-
plies. Negotiations have been concluded on a new bilateral 
agreement on steel and this should be signed and enter into 
force in the coming months. 
11 As decided by the Luxembourg European Council in De-
cember 1997, and also stated at the “Agenda 2000”, the EC 
produces annual “Regular Reports on a Candidate Country’s 
Progress towards Accession”. These “Regular Reports” 
have a predefined and very comprehensive structure which 
specifically shadows the implementation of the full EU’s 
legal framework, the “Acquis Communautaire”. Beyond a 
general evaluation of the so-called “Copenhagen” criteria, 
all the individual chapters of the “Acquis” are separately 
evaluated (namely, there are individual analyses concerning 
the free movement of goods, persons, services, capital; 
company law; competition policy; agriculture; fisheries; 
transport policy; taxation; EMU; statistics; social policy and 
employment; energy; industrial policy; small and medium-
sized enterprises; science and research; education and 
training; telecommunications and information technologies; 
culture and audiovisual policy; regional policy and coor-
dination of structural instruments; environment; consumers 
and health protection; co-operation in the field of justice and 
home affairs; customs union; external relations; CFSP; fi-
nancial control; financial and budgetary provisions). 
If anything, this “non-membership” limitation 
was not resolved by the new EU framework for 
non-enlargement external relations, better known 
as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Between March and July 2003, the European 
Commission (EC) issued a communication to the 
European Council and the European Parliament 
on “Wider Europe–Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours”. The EC further elabo-
rated the ENP in a “Strategy Paper” published in 
May 2004, and, for the main countries included 
in the ENP, individual “Country Reports” were 
also published at this time, including a “Country 
Report” on Ukraine. The ENP is supposed to 
cover the CIS, North African, and the Middle 
Eastern countries, but, somewhat peculiarly, not 
the South Eastern European (SEE) countries (the 
main instrument to regulate EU relations with 
these is the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, SPSEE12). This exclusion of the Western 
CIS from any explicit membership framework is 
even more curious when one remembers that, 
after Article 49 of the EU Treaty, any European 
state may apply to become a member (what was 
____________________ 
12 The SPSEE is a political declaration of commitment and 
a framework agreement on international co-operation to 
develop a shared strategy among all partners—including the 
representatives of the SEE—for stability and growth in 
South Eastern Europe. In the founding document of the 
Stability Pact, the EU, which has assumed a leading role in 
the Pact, undertakes to draw South Eastern Europe “closer 
to the perspective of full integration into its structures”, 
including the explicit possibility of full EU membership, 
which was reaffirmed at the EU–Western Balkans Summit 
in Thessalonica, June 2003. As a contribution to the SPSEE 
and an interim step towards EU membership, the European 
Union set up a new generation of Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreements (SAA). These are aimed specifically at 
the five South Eastern European countries which so far had 
no treaty-based direct relationship with the EU, i.e. Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia 
& Montenegro. Two countries, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia and Croatia, have already signed SAAs 
with the EU in April and October 2001, respectively, which 
are now in the process of ratification (agreements on trade 
and trade-related matters between the EU and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia entered into 
force in June 2001 and March 2002, respectively). Negotia-
tions with Albania were launched in early 2003 and a feasi-
bility study is in preparation for Serbia and Montenegro. For 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the feasibility study was finalized 
in November 2003. In March 2003 Croatia submitted an ap-
plication for EU membership, which was accepted on 18 
June 2004. 8 
demonstrated by the acceptance of Turkey as a 
candidate country in late 2004). 
This said, the lack of a clear EU policy to-
wards Ukraine’s membership was more than 
fully matched by a rather inconsistent European 
policy of the former Ukrainian government, with 
“virtual” initiatives (like the 1998 and 2000 
“National Programs” for EU accession, which 
aimed for the opening of accession negotiations 
during 2004–2007, or the re-naming of the 
Ministry of Economy into Ministry of Economy 
and European Integration) that lacked commit-
ment towards implementation and periodic 
threats to opt for an “Eastern-oriented” policy 
(Kuzio 2003). 
Additionally, one must remember that, histori-
cally, the EC was initially sceptical about all 
enlargements (with the possible exception of the 
Nordic-Central European accession of 1995, in-
volving the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden). The North 
Sea accession of 1973 (the Kingdom of Denmark, 
the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom) 
was effectively subject to two French vetoes for 
close to 10 years—linked to the persistent French 
suspicions about the intentions of the United 
Kingdom as a EU member state—while the formal 
negotiations for the Iberian accession of 1986 (the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic) 
lasted for almost 10 years (Vinhas de Souza 
1996).13 The 2004 enlargement wave is again a 
very instructive example of this: the process took 
close to 15 years for some countries, and that im-
____________________ 
13 The history of the Iberian attempts to join the then EEC 
(European Economic Community) is even longer than that. 
Looking at the Portuguese case, Portugal applied, not for 
membership, but for a trade agreement with the then EC as 
early as 1962, and again in 1967. These applications fol-
lowed the first British and other EFTA (European Free 
Trade Association, to which Portugal belonged) countries’ 
attempt to join the then EEC in 1961. The first UK applica-
tion, and the second one in 1967, were both blocked by 
France. The failures of both British attempts to join the EEC 
affected also the negotiations with Portugal. Only after the 
breakthroughs at the Hague Summit in 1969—that led to the 
1971’s first enlargement—was an agreement possible. The 
formal application for membership was finally made in 
March 28, 1977. The official negotiations lasted from Octo-
ber, 1978, to March, 1985. However, throughout this long 
waiting period several steps were taken to prepare the 
country for membership. Portugal duly became a member of 
the European Union on January 1, 1986. 
plied continued political pressure and negotiations 
with the Commission and the Council.14 There is 
virtually no reason to expect that a comparable 
long-term commitment would not also be neces-
sary for Ukraine. 
On the other hand, the EU will have to clarify 
its accession strategy for Ukraine. For this, a re-
view of the ENP to take into consideration ex-
plicitly further enlargements into Eastern Europe 
is likely necessary. The new political realities in 
the EU-25 (plus the strong influx of Eastern 
European personnel into all EU institutions) will 
provide the necessary support for such a review. 
Nevertheless, the real driver of such a strategic 
reassessment will necessarily be an actual formal 
application for membership by Ukraine, as this 
will overcome the natural internal institutional 
inertia of the EU. 
2.2 Copenhagen  Criteria:  Broad 
Institutional Performance 
Sustained progress in building market-based in-
stitutions is a sine qua non condition for entry 
into the EU. The process of EU enlargement is 
tightly bound to the concept of convergence. 
Membership to the EU demands the fulfillment 
of a series of political, legal, and economic crite-
ria (Foders et al. 2002). The member candidates 
must demonstrate political stability as a guaran-
tee for a democratic and lawful order, including 
____________________ 
14 As early as July 1989, a G-7 meeting decided to ask the 
European Commission to coordinate economic restructuring 
measures for Hungary and Poland (resulting in the creation 
of the PHARE Program). After a long lag, this evolved into 
the European Council meetings of Copenhagen of June 1993 
and Essen in December 1994, which defined an overall 
strategy to bring the associated countries of Eastern Europe 
closer to the Union. As a result of this, the formal appli-
cations for membership from the Eastern European Coun-
tries (Poland and Hungary applied as early as 1994), and the 
publication of the “Agenda 2000” in July 1997 by the 
European Commission, the EU launched in March 30, 1998 
official accession processes with some of these countries, 
but only after another Council meeting, held in Finland in 
December 1999, with all the applicant countries (that in 
2000). The accession negotiations where concluded at the 
European Summit in Copenhagen on December 12/13, 
2002, and the accession Treaties were signed in April 16, 
2003, allowing most of them to finally become member 
states in May 2004 (Bulgaria and Romania have been given 
2007 as a target date for their accession). 9 
maintaining human rights standards and ensuring 
the protection of minorities (political criteria). 
Furthermore, potential members must fully im-
plement the “Acquis Communautaire” (the entire 
body of EU law) into national legislation, and 
adopt the goals of the political, economic, and 
monetary union (legal criteria). Finally, the can-
didates must have a fully functioning market 
economy with the ability to maintain competi-
tiveness in the internal market (economic crite-
ria). These so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU 
membership insure a certain level of institutional 
development. This implies that institutional de-
velopment will be extremely important for po-
tential accession candidates in order to increase 
their chances for entry into the EU. 
Accession candidates, like other emerging 
market economies, will also benefit directly from 
institutional development (Schweickert and 
Thiele 2004). Empirical studies clearly show that 
institutions are an important explanatory variable 
for differences in economic performance (Edison 
2003, Rodrik 2003). Some authors even suggest 
that institutional weaknesses are the only funda-
mental reason for development failures, i.e., that 
long-run differences in income levels are solely 
determined by differences in institutional quality 
(Rodrik et al. 2002). The link between institution 
building and economic development is even rein-
forced by an increase in social capital and the 
convergence of values.15  
Therefore, it is rational for the EU to demand 
institutional convergence in order to make the 
EU more homogeneous both economically and 
politically and, thereby, to decrease the decision-
making costs. Any delay in the catch-up process 
runs the risk of conflicting assessments of politi-
cal and economic problems, thus undermining 
the integration process. Any delay in the catch-
up process will also put great stress on the EU 
budget in the form of transfer payments and agri-
cultural subsidies. 
Institutional development can be measured by 
resorting to the World Bank Governance Indicators 
(WBGI). In a comprehensive project (Kaufmann 
____________________ 
15  Economic development shifts the values of a society 
from “survival” to “self expression” which, in turn, fosters 
the process of institution building, especially the demand for 
democratic structures. See Inglehart et al. (2001). 
et al. 1999), the World Bank compiled data for a 
large country sample from many different sources 
(e.g., the Global Competitiveness Report of the 
World Economic Forum and the country reports 
of the Economist Intelligence Unit) and came up 
with an assessment of six indicators, which can 
be aggregated to three dimensions of institutional 
quality: Legislative Institutions (Political stability 
and absence of violence, Voice and account-
ability),  Executive Institutions (Government ef-
fectiveness, Quality of regulations), and Legal 
Institutions (Rule of law, Control of corruption). 
Notwithstanding technical and conceptual 
deficits,16 institutions as defined by the WBGI 
have been proven to explain economic develop-
ment. Additionally, the monitoring of the EU 
according to the Copenhagen criteria looks at 
institutions which also figure prominently in the 
WBGI: human rights, participation, rule of law, 
effectiveness of government, and control of cor-
ruption. Therefore, the WBGI provide a good 
basis to analyse from a bird eyes view the insti-
tutional development in the countries in the 
Balkan and the Black Sea regions (the Black Sea 
aggregate includes Ukraine) and compare their 
progress with the standards set by old and new 
members of the EU. 
Figure 4 shows the quality of overall, legis-
lative, executive, and legal institutions calculated 
as simple averages of the six basic WBGI on in-
stitutional development. The country groups 
show groups of old and new member countries as 
well as the remaining accession countries and 
other Balkan and Black Sea countries. The country 
groups are ordered according to the average per 
capita income. 
____________________ 
16 On the technical level, one has to keep in mind that the 
data are based on interviews with local experts and thus in-
clude a strong subjective element. On the conceptual level, 
the problem is that despite a general consensus on the insti-
tutions that have to be analysed, a number of questions 
about details—e.g. finding the right balance between com-
petition and regulation —do not have a unique answer. In an 
article, Stiglitz (1998) even argued that with respect to 
competition policy a consensus is neither possible nor desir-
able, because economic research will not be able to identify 
a competition policy that is optimal for all countries at all 
times. 10 
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As predicted by the empirical literature, Figure 
4 reveals a strong positive relationship between 
institutional and economic development. At the 
same time, it is evident that the current enlarge-
ment has already made the EU significantly more 
heterogeneous not to speak of future enlargement 
rounds ahead: 
• While the southern European countries that 
joined the EU in the 1980s closed the institu-
tional gap to the EU-15 considerably, the 
NMS reveal a significant institutional gap. 
This gap applies to all dimensions of institu-
tions measured by the WBGI. 
•  For the remaining accession countries (AC), 
Bulgaria and Romania, institutional develop-
ment is somewhat away from EU standards. 
•  Institutional development in the non-accession 
countries (NAC) in the Black Sea (including 
Ukraine) and Balkan regions is comparatively 
worse. Especially the Balkan countries, still 
suffering from disintegration and violent con-
flicts of the recent past and just beginning 
their nation building, urgently need institu-
tional development. 
•  Figure 4 also shows a clear pattern of institu-
tional development. Different to the old mem-
ber states of the EU, the development of legis-
lative institutions is far more advanced than 
executive and legal institutions.17 To some 
extent this seems to be quite natural given the 
rather fast transformation from socialism to 
democracy and the integration into a commu-
nity with internationally high democratic and 
economic standards. The formal introduction 
____________________ 
17 With the exception of administrative institutions in non-
accession countries in the Black Sea region. 11 
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of laws has still to be backed up by their im-
plementation. Neglecting the assessment of 
actual implementation implies that problems 
of integration may show up in the next years 
with potential negative implications for the 
willingness of EU member states to allow for 
further enlargements. 
Comparing the results for Ukraine and the four 
countries which are next in the queue for entry, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey, reveals 
that these countries are significantly less devel-
oped institutionally when measured by EU stan-
dards. Additionally, there are pronounced differ-
ences between these five countries. With respect 
to legislative institutions Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia perform far better than Ukraine and 
Turkey (Figure 5). 
This result is interesting for two reasons. First, 
Croatia, notwithstanding its initial difficulties, 
almost matches Bulgaria, which shows that pro-
gress with institutional reforms is possible even 
in a short time period. To the contrary, Turkey 
ranges even below Ukraine. Although the pro-
gress made in Turkey during recent years is not 
yet fully reflected in the WBGI, the fact that 
Turkey, according to the EU, has already ful-
filled the political criteria demonstrates that the 
start of accession negotiations primarily depends 
on the political will of EU member states. 
A different picture is drawn by the indicator 
on administrative institutions (Figure 6). As was 
to be expected on the basis of the comparison of 
country groups, the development of administra-
tive institutions lags behind the development of 
legislative ones in Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
and Ukraine. Turkey is an exception because 
administrative institutions clearly perform better 
than legislative ones. Although the difference 
from the EU standards is significant in all cases, 
Turkey together with Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania form a group of countries that comes 
closest. Ukraine is here clearly still far behind, 
albeit, of course, the data relate to the situation in 
2002. 
Finally, the indicator on legal institutions 
(Figure 7) reveals that Croatia outperforms the 
other countries that, again, perform worse with 
respect to the other institutional indicators. This 
result should have an impact on the prospects of 
Croatia  to join  the EU.  It is  at least  difficult to  12 
Figures 6: 



















-2 -1 0 1 2 –2 –1
Serbia&Montenegro
 
Source: WBGI; authors’ calculations. 
Figures 7: 



















-2 -1 0 1 2 –2 –1
Serbia&Montenegro
 
Source: WBGI; authors’ calculations. 13 
Figure 8: 
CPI Inflation Rate (2004 estimate)a 

















aVertical line shows Maastricht criteria. 
Source: DekaBank, DCRI January 2005. Frankfurt/Main. 
argue that Croatia should wait longer than 
Bulgaria and Romania if negotiations start soon 
and the chapters could be closed quickly. Again, 
Ukraine still has a long way to go, with legal in-
stitutions behind Turkey. 
Overall, benchmarking the institutional devel-
opment in EU neighbouring countries reveals the 
need for continued assistance from the side of the 
EU for institution building. This is an urgent re-
quirement should Ukraine go for accession ne-
gotiations and for the medium-term goal of 
joining Turkey in this process. However, the case 
of Croatia shows that it can be done and in a 
comparatively speedy manner. 
2.3 Maastricht  Criteria:  Macro/Nominal 
Convergence 
The Copenhagen criteria for entry into the EU do 
not only set institutional standards but also 
require macroeconomic stability as measured by 
the Maastricht indicators. Comparing inflation 
rates, budget balance, and public debt, the fol-
lowing figures again display the relative per-
formance of Ukraine, Turkey, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
and Romania against the standards currently set 
by EU members. Different to the figures on in-
stitutions, the old members are represented by 
the euro area. Additionally, the performance of 
Russia is included because the EU and Russia are 
the two poles between which macroeconomic 
management in Ukraine takes place. 
Figure 8 on inflation rates shows that among 
the five non-member countries only Croatia al-
ready meets the inflation criterion. As can also 
be seen, all NMS except Lithuania fail to meet 
this criterion. Ukraine is close to Russia, only 
slightly better than Turkey and Romania.18 
Ukraine’s performance with respect to fiscal 
data is much better. As revealed by Figure 9, the 
fiscal deficit is lower than the 3 percent criterion. 
Together with Russia, the Baltic countries and 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, Ukraine even 
outperforms  the euro area. Again, Turkey shows 
____________________ 
18  Albeit the results would vary greatly with the year 
chosen as a benchmark: for instance, Ukraine experienced 
an inflation rate of –0.6 per cent in 2002, which would have 
made it comfortably respect the inflation criterion. 14 
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aVertical line shows Maastricht criteria. 
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Figure 10: 
Public Debt as GDP Percentage (2004 estimate)a 

















aVertical line shows Maastricht criteria. 
Source: DekaBank, DCRI January 2005. Frankfurt/Main. 15 
up at the end of the scale, with a fiscal deficit 
more than double that of Poland, the NMS with 
the highest fiscal deficit. 
A similar picture is shown in Figure 10 with 
respect to public debt. Here, Turkey is the only 
country that shows a higher indebtedness, to-
gether with the euro area, which currently does 
not meet its own standards. Except for Bulgaria, 
which started with a very high level of indebted-
ness, the same group as before—among them 
Russia—shows the best fiscal performance. All 
in all, the macro picture on the basis of inflation 
and fiscal data reveals that Ukraine still needs to 
undergo some additional nominal convergence. 
This is only in absolute terms, as in relative 
terms Ukraine and other non-member countries 
perform quite well when compared to the NMS. 
The exception is Turkey: this is the only country 
in the sample that fails to meet any of the three 
criteria discussed here. Hence, according to the 
Maastricht criteria, Ukraine is considerably closer 
to Brussels than Turkey is. 
The Copenhagen criteria on macroeconomic 
stability do not only focus on the Maastricht 
criteria but also explicitly mention a sustainable 
external position. Table 1 shows some indicators 
on the external position comparing the five non-
member countries with the new member coun-
tries in this respect. The following stylized facts 
can be summarized: 
• Average external debt figures are generally 
most favourable in the accession group. How-
ever, a lot of heterogeneity is hidden behind 
these average figures. While Ukraine shows 
the lowest debt and short-term debt ratios of 
the total sample, Croatia (together with Esto-
nia) has the highest ratio of external debt, and 
debt service is the highest for Turkey. Gener-
ally, Ukraine performs very well in this re-
spect, both compared to all countries in the 
sample, but especially when compared to 
Turkey and Croatia.  
•  A similar picture is revealed with respect to 
the current account deficits adjusted for FDI 
inflows and the reserve ratio. Again, the two 
non-accession countries outperform the other 
groups; with Ukraine benefiting from a high 
current account surplus while FDI inflows are 
rather moderate. Looking at the non-member 
countries in total, only the low reserve ratio in 
the case of Turkey gives some reason for 
concerns. 
• The situation with respect to exchange rate 
stability is different. Here, all countries show 
either stable or appreciating currencies. Ukraine 
is the only country where the real exchange 
rate depreciated strongly. This fits the high 
monetary expansion and increasing inflation 
rates in recent years. It also explains the high 
current account surplus. 
Summarizing the evidence for the relative per-
formance of Ukraine when compared to Croatia 
and Turkey, only the real exchange rate instabil-
ity is on the negative side, while especially the 
figures on external debt are favourable for exter-
nal stability. For the other two countries, a high 
external debt ratio in the case of Croatia and a 
high debt service ratio as well as a low reserve 
ratio in the case of Turkey may endanger exter-
nal stability. 
Based on the relative indicators analysed in 
this chapter, Ukraine performs quite well when 
compared to the other countries in the queue for 
entry into the EU. Especially the fiscal and ex-
ternal debt figures are better than in other coun-
tries. On the negative side, there is a considerable 
backlog with respect to the development of ad-
ministrative and judicial institutional capacities, 
and a potential for macroeconomic instability 
due to monetary expansion, rising inflation rates, 
and real exchange rate instability. While strong 
real depreciation was favourable for the current 
account, real exchange rate instability as well as 
the institutional problems may be the main rea-
sons why FDI inflows have remained moderate. 
This leads to the conclusion that Ukraine ur-
gently needs to develop its institutions and stabi-
lize its inflation and exchange rates in order to 
improve its European perspective and to move 
closer to Brussels. 16 
Table 1: 
















Czech Republic  35.5  21.8  6.2 –4.6  4.6 –0.0 36.8 –0.2 
Estonia  80.3 36.6 13.5  –14.5  5.5 –9.0 34.8  0.9 
Hungary  57.2 14.2 24.5 –9.1  2.3 –6.8 27.6  3.8 
Lithuania  46.0 29.9 14.4 –8.5  3.0 –5.5 53.3 –0.9 
Latria  74.4  112.5 14.8  –10.9  3.8 –7.1 34.4 –0.4 
Poland  41.7  20.0  16.0  –1.4 1.7 0.2  36.8  –2.1 
Slovenia  45.5  0.8 14.7 –0.3 –0.5 –0.8 44.6  0.0 
Slovakia  46.1  20.5 8.0  –3.6 3.9 0.3  52.4 9.0 
NMS-8  53.3 32.0 14.0 –6.6  3.0 –3.6 40.1  1.3 
Bulgaria  61.9  23.1  12.4  –7.0 9.7 2.7  60.0 3.0 
Romania  35.5 6.0  14.4  –6.0 5.5  –0.4  71.5 2.2 
Turkey  51.1 32.0 36.9 –3.6  0.7 –3.0 24.7 –0.1 
AC-3  32.5 9.7 8.9  –4.3 5.1 0.8  43.8 1.7 
Croatia  78.9 3.3  20.4  –5.3 2.4  –2.9  37.5  –0.4 
Ukraine  27.3 1.2  12.9  10.2 2.3  12.5  38.7  –7.5 
NAC-2 53.1  2.3  16.7  2.4 2.3 4.8  38.1  –4.0 
Source: DekaBank, DCRI January 2005. Frankfurt/Main. 
3  The Current Status of Reforms 
in Ukraine 
3.1  The Macroeconomic Framework 
A robust macroeconomic framework is indeed 
necessary for a successful EU membership proc-
ess. Since 1998, truly great strides have been 
made in terms of the macro stabilization frame-
work in Ukraine.19 The budgetary procedure is 
much more consolidated—albeit further progress 
is necessary—the inflation rate has decreased 
substantially, economic growth is not only posi-
tive, but high, and the current account is in sur-
plus. Most notably, the NBU has, since 1998, 
proved itself as a credible and independent 
monetary authority, eliminating the monetary 
financing of budget deficits. 
From a budgetary perspective, the full devel-
opment of a formal medium-term budgetary 
framework would be of great assistance for the 
government in assessing its medium-term com-
mitments and resources, given the need of even-
____________________ 
19 As just one example of this, the quasi-fiscal deficit of the 
energy sector in Ukraine dropped from 4 per cent of GDP in 
2000 to 0.2 per cent in 2004 (IMF 2005), by a combination 
of increased tax collection and reduction of barter arrange-
ments. 
tual increases of expenditure in areas that imply 
multiyear programmes in Ukraine (for instance, 
in investment on the improvement of infrastruc-
ture or in the—implicit and explicit—pension 
and retirement commitments: see IMF 2005). 
From an EU integration perspective, these would 
also be useful, as they would enable a medium-
term evaluation of accession-related expenditures 
and revenues. Additionally, from an even longer-
run perspective, they would be compatible with 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)20 and its 
medium-term framework for fiscal policies, the 
national multi-year “Programs for Stability and 
Growth”. 
____________________ 
20 The SGP aims to assure the continuous compliance with 
the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, and to assure 
medium-term budgetary positions in surplus or close to bal-
ance for the euro area member states. To try to impose a 
more binding constraint on the fiscal behaviour of the mem-
ber countries of EMU, a system of punitive pecuniary fines 
was introduced by it, through which—after a lengthy joint 
political decision process, with ultimate decision placed on 
an unanimous vote by the Council—individual EU member 
countries that incur deficits that are deemed to be “ex-
cessive”—namely, over the 3 per cent benchmark—would 
transfer up to 0.5 per cent of their GDP to the Union. The 
SGP also aims to create a medium-term framework for 
fiscal policies, through the national multi-year “Programs 
for Stability and Growth”. After several member states 
repeatedly broke the limits during the early 2000s, many 
reform proposals led to give the SGP a more “flexible” 
interpretation. 17 
Nevertheless, from a macro framework per-
spective, the most pressing issue is likely to be 
the effects of the USD exchange rate targeting 
policy, in an environment of strong external sur-
pluses. In the absence of sterilization policies, this 
led to double-digit increases in money supply, 
with, so far, rather limited inflationary effects, 
due to a remonetization process common to most 
transition economies and to the substantial re-
duction of “barter” payment procedures. 
It is advisable that Ukraine gradually moves 
towards more exchange rate flexibility, in order 
to gain greater control over monetary aggregates, 
to avoid the buildup of financial vulnerabilities 
and any loss of external competitiveness. Un-
fortunately, whereas there is a broad agreement 
on the need of such a change, there is much less 
agreement on the best alternatives (Yushchenko 
2000), given the practical difficulties that remain 
in implementing monetary policy in the Ukraine 
(as they do in other CIS countries; see Esanov et 
al. 2004): to mention but two, the monetary 
transmission mechanism is still unstable (Bilan 
2004, Golodniuk 2004, Leheyda 2004), and there 
is a potential—and growing—“fear of floating” 
problem, when one looks at the level of dollari-
zation of liabilities in the financial system (IMF 
2005). 
Among the alternative frameworks available 
to Ukraine, continuing with the current exchange 
rate anchor is one, as it can be made more 
flexible by the relatively simple targeting of a 
basket made of the USD and the EUR: this 
would reduce depreciation pressures, inflows, 
and the need to sterilize those. Such exchange 
rate anchor frameworks also provide a clear 
indication to the public about monetary policy 
and act to discipline fiscal policy, beyond being 
relatively easy to manage. Additionally, a clearer 
link to the euro may be useful for a greater inte-
gration with the EU. 
Other potential alternatives are money or in-
terest rate rules coupled with a floating exchange 
rate, but it is clear that Ukraine has neither the 
stable structural relationships nor the deep finan-
cial markets that will enable their successful im-
plementation in the short run (van Aarle et al. 
2004). 
3.2  The Microeconomic Framework 
It is necessary to recognize that the progress in 
terms of microeconomic reforms (or what could 
be called “second generation issues”, i.e., those 
issues that arise when macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion has been achieved) necessary for member-
ship has been limited so far in Ukraine, albeit its 
level is relatively high when compared with 
other CIS and SEE countries (see previous sec-
tion). 
We, therefore, define here by “microeconomic 
framework” the regulatory framework necessary 
for long-run growth, once macro stabilization has 
been achieved. Many aspects need to be dealt 
with in Ukraine, from wholesale improvement of 
the enforcement of legislation to judiciary re-
form, in what will necessarily be an effort for 
many years. Therefore, in this section we will 
only briefly deal with two specific questions, tax 
and regulatory/competition reform, that we con-
sider to be essential not only for a successful EU 
integration, but, much more importantly, for a 
sustained increase in the Ukrainian population’s 
welfare (Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine 
2004). 
3.2.1 Tax  Reforms 
Since independence (the State Tax Administra-
tion was created only in 1996), Ukraine’s tax 
system has developed by stages and somewhat 
inconsistently. As a result, Ukraine does not yet 
have a unified tax code. Additionally, Ukraine 
shares a similar feature with the Central Euro-
pean NMS: the tax ratio to GDP is higher (at 
roughly 40 per cent, including payroll taxes) than 
in countries with comparable GDP per capita 
levels. 
Ukraine’s tax revenues basically rely on four 
taxes (value-added tax, tax on corporate profits, 
personal income tax, and excise duties), which 
together accounted for 87 per cent of all revenues 
in 2003. The system is unstable, complex, and 
inconsistent, with continuous legal changes since 
independence and persistent discriminatory tax 
exemptions to certain sectors (mostly state-
owned and energy-related or energy-intensive 
enterprises). A possible solution would be an ef-18 
fort to simplify and unify the code, while reduc-
ing overall taxation (by, for instance, reducing 
the tax on corporate profits—as was done by 
other NMS like Estonia and Slovakia—and the 
VAT, but without running into conflict with 
EU’s minimum VAT levels, and reducing tax 
exemptions). 
3.2.2  Privatization and Regulatory Reform 
Ukraine’s private sector is now reasonably de-
veloped, as an early mass privatization ensured 
the development and predominance of the non-
state sector of the economy. However, the trans-
formation of the state production sector remains 
far from complete. About 15,000 enterprises, 350 
controlling interests of the largest production 
joint-stock companies and holdings, and 1,500 
blocks of minority shareholdings remain in state 
hands, at the State Property Fund. The state con-
tinues to control the most capital-intensive enter-
prises: two-thirds of the capital assets of the real 
sector remain in state ownership. Thus far, pri-
vatization has been rather limited in the follow-
ing sectors: 
•  Energy industry (including electric power gen-
eration and distribution); 
•  Transport industry (including pipelines); 
•  Post and communication: telecommunications 
(infrastructure, maintenance, and services); 
• Public  utilities; 
• Military-industrial sectors (defence, space, 
aviation, and shipbuilding). 
Given the systemic nature of these industries, 
with complex questions related to competition, 
their privatisation should probably avoid the 
“mass privatization” process and instead opt for 
IPOs (Initial Public Offers), probably with the 
preselection of strategic partners or consortiums 
that include foreign members. 
In addition to completing privatization, a more 
robust and consistent competition policy should 
be developed. Competition policy is crucial for a 
functioning market economy and for sustainable 
economic growth. 
The Ukrainian institutional framework for 
competition policy is currently made up of an 
Anti-Monopoly Committee (AMC), created in 
1994, and some industry regulatory bodies (like 
the National Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(NERC) and the National Communication Regu-
latory Commission (NCRC)). Further reforms are 
needed to improve competition and the enforce-
ment of competition legislation. Extensive state 
subsidies and regulatory capture by business 
groups result in unequal treatment of market 
participants and distort the allocation of re-
sources. Inefficient regulation and delays in 
bankrupting insolvent firms prevent enterprise 
restructuring and preserve outdated industrial 
structures. Among the necessary reforms are the 
institutional and technical reforms (for instance, 
tariff setting by the regulatory bodies sometimes 
does not follow a clear economic logic), the 
strengthening of the AMC and the industry 
regulatory bodies, plus the effective separation of 
them from government. Also, some industries 
still lack independent regulatory bodies, for in-
stance such as public utilities (water supply, 
sewerage, and heating) and transportation; before 
privatizing such industries, regulatory bodies will 
have to be created. The legal framework for pro-
viding state aid also needs to be improved signif-
icantly. The linkages and consistency between 
these components can be seen in practical terms 
in the way that they enabled greater FDI inflows 
in the NMS, and, consequently, reform of pro-
ductive structures and a greater degree of inter-
national integration.  
The financial sector of the NMS provides an 
example. It has some features that make them 
distinct both from advanced industrial economies 
and “transition” economies (Vinhas de Souza 
2004). The main characteristics are the generally 
low (compared with advanced economies) level 
of financial intermediation, strong dominance of 
the banking sector within financial intermedia-
tion, very high degree of foreign (mostly EU) in-
volvement in the newly privatized banking sec-
tor—foreign companies now hold the majority of 
the assets of the banking system in virtually all 
of the NMS bar Slovenia.21 The overall health in 
____________________ 
21 In Bulgaria, around 80 per cent of the assets of the bank-
ing system are foreign-owned, 95 per cent in the Czech Re-
public, 63 per cent in Hungary, 70 per cent in Poland, 55 per 
cent in Romania, and 83 per cent in Slovakia. In the Baltic 
republics, around 98 per cent of assets in Estonia, 68 per 19 
the financial systems in the NMS, regardless of 
their “starting conditions”, seem to be very robust, 
with good capitalization levels and a continuous 
decrease of non-performing loans (Reininger et al. 
2002), which is especially important in an envi-
ronment of fast financial deepening, with double-
digit rates of real growth of private credit. 
Ukraine shares some similarities with the 
NMS, but also some dissimilarities, mainly 
linked to the sheer fact that it is, in spite of its 
much improved macroeconomic situation since 
the 1998 financial crisis, still in a substantially 
lower liberalization and reform level than those 
countries. For instance, of the 158 banks (June 
2004 data) in Ukraine (Ukraine has a bank-cen-
tred financial system; a rather marginal share of 
financial assets is held by non-banking institu-
tions), only 6 are wholly foreign-owned, and with 
a marginal share of assets.22 Following the NMS, 
building the necessary legal/institutional frame-
work and allowing EU financial institutions to 
service the domestic market would generate sub-
stantial benefits for Ukraine, especially in the 
current environment of strong credit growth. 
____________________ 
cent in Latvia, and 87 per cent in Lithuania are foreign-
owned. Slovenia is the “laggard”, with 25.3 per cent of its 
banking system still state-owned (Romania has the highest 
share of state ownership, with 42 per cent), and only 28 per 
cent foreign-owned—which, nevertheless, was almost a 
doubling of the share, just between 2001 and 2002 (Vinhas 
de Souza 2004). 
22 The banking system in Ukraine is dominated by seven 
large banks, usually called “system banks”, that have 
slightly more than 55 per cent of total banking system assets 
(end of 2003). Among these banks two are state banks 
(Oshchadbank and UkrEximbank) and two former state 
banks (Prominvestbank and Ukrsotsbank), which have a 
generally low efficiency level and high costs relative to 
other banks. Inherited close links with the government allow 
these banks to enjoy loose supervision and enforcement of 
prudential norms by the central bank. Often, the government 
grants them exclusive rights to service various government 
accounts and projects (servicing of budget accounts, state 
pension funds, etc.), which explains their large asset size. 
They have a low capitalization and the highest proportion of 
the delinquent loans. 
4 “Sandwiched”  between  Russia 
and the EU: Costs and Benefits 
for Ukraine 
Trade is very important for Ukraine (the open-
ness index for it—as measured by the sum of ex-
ports and imports over GDP—exceeds 100 per 
cent) and, as indicated in Section 1, it has been 
one of the main recent drivers of growth. As 
some of the recent very impressive increase in 
trade flows is linked to temporary factors23 (the 
devaluations of the hryvnia and increase in world 
ferrous metal prices), it is necessary to consider 
elements that will enable Ukraine to sustain such 
a trend growth in the long run. Among those 
elements are the entry into the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) and a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with the EU. 
4.1  Regional Peculiarities of Ukraine’s 
Trade Regime: The Institutional 
Aspect 
4.1.1 Ukraine–Russia 
Regarding institutional arrangements with Russia 
one can say that Ukraine’s trade regime is deter-
mined by both CIS-wide arrangements and bilat-
eral agreements. Numerous CIS-wide agree-
ments (like the CIS Economic Union, CIS Free 
Trade Zone, CIS Common Agricultural Market, 
etc.) have failed so far to be implemented in full. 
In this respect we should mention one agree-
ment, which generated many discussions in 
Ukraine and outside. In September 2003, the 
Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine signed two documents—an Agreement 
on the establishment of a Single Economic Space 
(SES) and the Concept (Guidelines) of Single 
Economic Space formation among the four 
countries. Agreement and Concept (Guidelines) 
defined the SES as “an area consisting of the 
customs territories of the participants, where the 
mechanisms of economic regulation are intended 
to ensure the free movement of goods, services, 
____________________ 
23 Others are “structural”, like the lower costs of Ukrainian 
labour. 20 
capital, and labour; where a common foreign-
trade policy is carried out, and fiscal, monetary, 
and foreign-exchange policies are coordinated to 
the extent needed in securing fair competition 
and macroeconomic stability”. 
The main intentions of the SES were to estab-
lish an FTA between the four countries, to im-
plement common policies for trade, competition, 
regulation, and standardization, to ensure free 
movement of production factors, and to harmo-
nize macroeconomic policy and network regula-
tion. It was envisioned that all of these ambitious 
objectives are to be implemented gradually, each 
country determining its speed of integration in-
dependently (so-called ‘multi-level and multi-
speed integration’). Eventually, a single commis-
sion in which each member state will have a 
voting weight proportional to its economic size 
would govern all policies.24 Hence, the concept 
of the SES foresees the immediate implemen-
tation of an FTA with the intention of eventually 
creating a customs union that may even include 
some elements of higher integration levels. 
Moreover, according to the Guidelines, the 
first step is the creation of a free trade zone with-
out exceptions or limitations. It seeks to establish 
a unified policy on tariff and non-tariff regula-
tions, unified rules for competition, the use of 
subsidies, and other forms of state support, while 
eliminating anti-dumping, compensatory, and 
other special defensive measures in mutual trade. 
In other words, already at this first stage the 
creation of a customs union was envisaged, that 
is, a form of union requiring a unified customs 
policy. 
In one essential aspect, these agreements are 
distinct from other agreements signed by Ukraine: 
they anticipate the coordination of national posi-
tions in negotiating membership in the WTO. 
The Guidelines, in particular, specifies that, if 
one member enters the WTO before others, it 
will promote the earliest entry into the WTO of 
other SES members and, once WTO negotiations 
are underway, to refrain from advancing de-
mands of their own. Thus, for the first time, a 
____________________ 
24 Assuming that economic weight of a country is deter-
mined by its GDP, Russia would get a dominant position in 
the commission governing the SES, as in the old Soviet 
Union. 
kind of “non-aggression principle” in negotia-
tions with the WTO would have been officially 
set. 
At the moment it seems that the feasibility of 
this project is rather low and probably any ac-
tivities related to it will be limited to an attempt 
to create an FTA among the partners. The crea-
tion of any such deep regional arrangements 
would effectively mean a rejection of the EU 
membership intentions for Ukraine. 
Bilateral trade relations between Ukraine and 
Russia are regulated by a free trade agreement 
signed in June 24, 1993. This agreement covers 
all goods except sugar, tobacco goods, certain 
spirits, chocolate, and candies. Ukraine–Russia 
steel trade is regulated by a special agreement 
envisaging quotas on Ukraine’s steel products 
exported to Russia. 
4.1.2 Ukraine–EU 
As far as Ukraine’s relations with EU are con-
cerned, they are based upon the following 
agreements: 
• Agreement between Ukraine and European 
Community on Trade in Textile Products 
(signed in 1993, new Agreement signed in 
2000);  
•  Agreement between the Government of 
Ukraine and the Commission of the European 
Communities on the Establishment and the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Delegation of 
the Commission of the European Communities 
in Ukraine (signed in 1993);  
• Agreement between the Commission of the 
European Communities and the Government 
of Ukraine setting up a Contact Group on Coal 
and Steel (signed in 1994);  
• Partnership and Cooperation Agreement be-
tween the European Communities and their 
member states, and Ukraine (signed in 1994);  
•  Agreement between the Government of 
Ukraine and the European Coal and Steel 
Community on Trade in Certain Steel Prod-
ucts (signed in 1997);  
•  Agreement for Cooperation between the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community and the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the Field of 
Controlled Nuclear Fusion (signed in 1999). 21 
It should also be mentioned that in March 
2003 Ukraine and the EU signed a bilateral pro-
tocol for market access in goods and services in 
the framework of Ukraine’s WTO accession. 
Since 1 January 1993, Ukraine has become a 
beneficiary of the Generalized Scheme of Prefer-
ences (GSP).25 These preferences are differen-
tiated between two product categories: non-sen-
sitive and sensitive products. Tariff duties on 
non-sensitive products continue to be suspended, 
while duties on sensitive products enjoy a tariff 
reduction. One must note that EU GSP benefits 
are not granted to the commodities accounting 
for a considerable part of Ukrainian exports (iron 
and steel, fertilizers, fishery products, grain, seeds, 
fruits, and plants). Still, the GSP should be con-
sidered as a tool for facilitating the access of 
Ukrainian goods to the EU market. Trade regu-
lation in the steel and textiles sectors should be 
mentioned specifically: 
Concerning steel the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine provides in Article 22(1) that trade in 
some steel products is to be the subject of a spe-
cial agreement. The previous bilateral agreement 
between the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) and the Government of Ukraine on 
trade for certain steel products expired on 31 De-
cember 2001. The European Community has 
taken over the international obligations of the 
ECSC since the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, and 
measures relating to trade in steel products with 
third countries now fall under the competence of 
the Community in the field of trade policy. The 
Parties agreed to conclude a new agreement and 
the negotiations of this new agreement have not 
yet been completed. Pending the signature and 
the entry into force of the new agreement, quan-
titative limits for the year 2004 were determined. 
Given that the tax of 30 euros/tonne on exports 
of ferrous scrap Ukraine applied as of 1 January 
2003 has not been lifted nor diminished, the EU 
____________________ 
25  The last time the Council Regulation No 2501/2001   
of 10 December 2001 extended the application of the   
scheme of generalized tariff preferences was for the period 
from 1  January 2002 to 31 December 2004 (COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001; 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 346, 31.12. 2001, 
pp. 1–59). 
found it appropriate to set the quantitative limits 
for the year 2004 at the same level as for the year 
2003. Later on November 22, 2004 the Agree-
ment between the Government of Ukraine and 
the European Community on trade in certain 
steel products for 2004 was signed envisaging a 
certain increase in steel quotas. At that time the 
Parties have also proclaimed their readiness to 
start the negotiations on new steel agreement to 
regulate their steel trade starting from 2005–
2006. This new agreement has yet to be signed. 
Concerning textiles, trade in textiles between 
the EU and Ukraine is regulated by a separate 
agreement, signed in December 2000 (replacing 
a previous agreement dating back to 1993), 
aimed at reciprocal liberalization of trade in tex-
tiles and clothing. The Parties agreed to refrain 
from adopting any non-tariff measures that could 
hinder trade in textile and clothing products if 
certain conditions are met by the Ukrainian side. 
Ukraine’s commitments under this agreement 
were: 
•  First, to bound tariff rates applicable to EU 
textile imports from Ukraine to the level of 
tariffs as of July 2000, and 
• Second, reduce them to the level not ex-
ceeding the rate EU has bound in WTO.26 
One of the problems plaguing EU–Ukraine 
relations is granting Ukraine the market economy 
status, linked to anti-dumping investigations 
against Ukraine.27 Anti-dumping measures are 
applied particularly frequently against steel and 
chemicals, two categories that comprise nearly 
half of Ukraine’s total exports. According to the 
WTO, Ukraine ranked 13
th in the world as a tar-
get of anti-dumping measures between January 
1995 and June 2004, with 51 anti-dumping 
measures concluded by various countries (a share 
____________________ 
26 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between 
the European Community and Ukraine concerning the ex-
tension and amendment of the Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and Ukraine on trade in 
textile products initiated on 5 May 1993, at last amended by 
the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters initi-
ated on 15 October 1999 (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 16, 18.1. 2001, pp. 3–34). 
27 One must remember the granting of “market economy” 
status by the EU to Russia, an economy with a liberalization 
level similar to Ukraine’s, in 2002. 22 
of anti-dumping measures about ten times 
greater than Ukraine’s share of world trade). 
From those, 8 originated from the EU-25. 
In October 2000, the EU Council of Ministers 
passed a decision allowing a “market economy 
enterprise” status for particular Ukrainian firms 
that can substantiate that they operate under 
market economy conditions.28 At the same time, 
the European Commission informed Ukraine that 
there are two unresolved issues, which are sig-
nificant in the context of trade-defence investi-
gations: 
• Bankruptcy legislation: the EU Commission 
believes that current legislation prevents cer-
tain state-owned enterprises from going bank-
rupt under circumstances which are not suffi-
ciently defined. There are also concerns that 
proper enforcement of bankruptcy law may 
not be ensured vis-à-vis “city-forming enter-
prises”, which may have potential capacity to 
export whilst technically bankrupt; 
•  State interventions in price setting mechanism: 
the EU Commission believes that distorting 
state interference in the pricing of goods con-
tinues and appears to be on the increase in 
certain sectors, in particular fertilizers and 
metals, which are of key importance in the 
context of trade-defence measures. 
Nevertheless, some of the main limitations in 
trade and thus in the FTA seem to be domestic 
(World Bank 2004), related to legislation, in-
adequate compatibility of standards, inefficiency 
of customs, and related tax procedures. An FTA 
with the EU that did explicitly incorporate the 
transposition of EU legislation (EU company 
legislation, EU rules on standardization and cer-
tification, EU competition rules, EU customs 
procedures, etc.) would not only help eliminate 
those internal limiting factors but would also 
strongly support the EU integration process. 
An assumption present in some studies is that 
the process of WTO membership—Ukraine an-
nounced its intention to join the WTO as early as 
____________________ 
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/200 amending Regu-
lation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped im-
ports from countries not members of the European Commu-
nity; Official Journal of the European Communities, L 257, 
11.10. 2000. 
1993—can be a stepping-stone for EU mem-
bership, given that some of the requirements are 
similar for both processes (Blue Ribbon Com-
mission for Ukraine 2004, World Bank 2004) 
and that it should, therefore, precede it. Albeit 
true, in the sense that no country has ever entered 
the Union without having first entered the WTO, 
the connection between these two “options” is 
not so strong. As the experience of the last en-
largement round shows, most of the applications 
for EU membership preceded WTO membership, 
and frequently by several years (Table 2).29 The 
Baltic countries, whose economies most resemble 
the sort of problems faced by Ukraine, only 
entered the WTO as late as 1999. For most of the 
former EU candidate countries, the causality was 
actually the reverse: the fulfillment of WTO 
membership conditions arose as a by-product of 
the EU accession process. 
Additionally, the assumption that the WTO is 
an effective framework provider that will en-
hance domestic reforms—especially on the scale 
necessary for EU accession—seems to overesti-
mate the “minimum common denominator” ne-
gotiation process that actually leads to WTO 
membership (which, among other things, is re-
sponsible for the usually disappointing trade in-
creases after WTO accession). 30 
EU membership, by its very nature, is clearly 
a great deal more effective in exporting a much 
more robust and comprehensive regulatory 
framework than the WTO, and the process of 
implementing this framework (as again shown by 
the previous enlargement round) starts several 
years before  actual accession.  Therefore,  if one 
assumes EU membership as the main objective, 
the EU integration process includes all the neces-
sary reforms  for WTO  entry.  This is  especially  
____________________ 
29 The same does not apply to achieving some sort of FTA 
with the EU: as again one can see from Table 2 that FTAs 
with the EU usually preceded both WTO entry and the offi-
cial EU application membership by several years. 
30  Rose (2003) estimated that WTO accession has non-
significant trade-creating effects, contrary to regional FTAs, 
which have strong significantly positive trade-creating ef-
fects, possibly due to the “lowest common denominator” 
constraints of the WTO accession negotiation process, while 
regional/bilateral FTAs usually go much deeper towards 
liberalization amongst its members (like, for instance, the 
EU itself). This conclusion is also backed for Ukraine by 
Eremenko et al. (2004). 23 
Table 2: 
Membership of International Organizations by EU Applicant Countries 
Countries  EU Association Agreements:  





IMF Article VIII Compatibility 
Bulgaria  – Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed 3/93). A 
“Europe” Trade Agreement also signed in 
3/93. 
– Application for EU membership: 12/95 
– EU Entry: 2007 
  1 December 1996  –IMF entry: 25/9/90. Article 
VIII: 24/9/98. 
Croatia –  Independence:  6/91 
– Stabilization & Association Agreement: 10/01.
– Application for EU membership: 2/03. 
– EU Entry: ? 
  30 November 2000 –IMF entry: 14/12/92.Article 
VIII: 29/5/95. 
Czech Rep.  – Czechoslovakia break-up: 1/1/93. 
– (New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (old one 
signed in 12/91, new in 10/93). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement since 3/92 (signed in 12/91).
– Application for EU membership: 1/96. 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
–12/95: OECD 
membership.
1 January 1995  –IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the 
Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic; since 1/93 as  
separate states). Article VIII: 
1/10/95. 
Estonia –  Independence:  20/8/91 
– Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
– Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 7/94. 
– Application for EU membership: 11/95. 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
  13 November 1999 –IMF entry: 25/5/92. Article 
VIII: 15/8/94. 
Hungary –  Europe  Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). A 
“Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 (also 
signed in 12/91). 
– Application for EU membership: 3/94. 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
–5/96: OECD 
Membership.
1 January 1995  –IMF entry: 05/06/1982. Article 
VIII: 1/1/96. 
Latvia –  Independence:  21/8/91. 
– Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
– Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 7/94. 
– Application for EU membership: 10/95. 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
  10 February 1999  –IMF entry: 19/5/92. Article 
VIII: 10/6/94. 
Lithuania  – Independence: declared in 11/3/90, only 
accepted by URSS in 6/9/91. 
– Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
– Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 7/94. 
– Application for EU membership: 12/95 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
  31 May 2001  –IMF entry: 29/4/92. Article 
VIII: 3/5/94. 
Poland  – Europe Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). A 
“Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 (also 
signed in 12/91). 
– Application for EU membership: 4/94. 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
–11/96: OECD 
Membership.
1 July 1995  –IMF entry: 06/12/86. Article 
VIII: 1/6/95. 
Romania  – Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed in 2/93). A 
“Europe” Trade Agreement (also signed in 
2/93). 
– Application for EU membership: 6/95 
– EU Entry (expected): 2007 
  1 January 1995  –IMF entry: 15/12/72. Article 
VIII: 25/3/1998. 
Slovakia  – Czechoslovakia break-up: 1/1/93. 
– (New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed: 
10/93). A Trade Agreement since 3/92 (signed: 
12/91). 
– Application for EU membership: 6/95 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
–8/00: OECD 
Membership.
1 January 1995  –IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the 
Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic; since 1/93, as 
separate states). Article VIII: 
1/10/95. 
Slovenia –  Independence:  25/6/91. 
– Europe Agreement: 2/99 (signed 6/96). 
– Application for EU membership: 6/96 
– EU Entry: May 2004 
  30 July 1995  –IMF entry: 14/12/92. Article 
VIII: 1/9/95. 
Ukraine  – Independence: 24/8/91. 
– EU Entry: ? 
   –IMF entry: 3/9/92. Article VIII: 
24/9/96. 
Source: Vinhas de Souza (2004), modified by the authors. 24 
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Source: National Bank of Ukraine. 
true within the framework of a pre-accession 
FTA, as was the case with the last enlargement 
wave. 
4.1.3  The Level of Economic Integration with 
the EU 
After the enlargement in May 2004, the EU be-
came the largest trade partner of Ukraine. Trade 
with the EU-25 is estimated to account for ap-
proximately one-third for merchandise exports 
and imports in 2004, with total trade turnover at 
almost 15 billion euros. In spite of this fact, it is 
still substantially below the share from the eight 
new EU member states from Eastern Europe 
several years before their EU accession (one 
must also note that the only EU neighbouring 
countries without free trade agreements with the 
EU are Moldova, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine). 
The role of Russia—although it is still the 
largest single country trade partner for Ukraine—
has gradually and substantially diminished. The 
most significant decline is registered for Ukraine’s 
exports to Russia, which halved their share in 
total Ukraine’s exports from 36 per cent in 1996 
to 17 per cent in 2004 (Figure 11). Export flows 
were redirected towards both the EU-25 and to 
the rest of the world, in particular Asia. 
As regards imports, the decrease in trade with 
Russia was far less significant, primarily because 
of its importance as a source of energy products 
for Ukraine. While during the last nine years the 
share of imports from Russia declined by 6 per-
centage points to approximately 38 per cent in 
2004, in nominal terms imports have even 
slightly increased. 
The structure of Ukraine’s trade with the EU-
25 and with Russia differs quite significantly. In 
the most simplified terms, Ukrainian trade flows 
include westward movement of raw materials 
and semi-processed goods, and the eastward (op-
posite) movement of final products, primarily in-
vestment goods. These counter-movements char-
acterize both Ukraine–EU and Ukraine–Russia 
trade relations. 25 
Table 3: 
Structure of Ukraine’s Exports by the Level of Processing in 1996 and 2002 (percent)a 
 EU-25  EU-15  NMS  Russia 
  1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 
Raw  materials  29 20 20 16 41 26  4  3 
Semi-processed  products  32 31 32 29 32 35 45 31 
Final  goods  33 45 39 49 27 38 52 66 
aApplied methodology does not allow classifying all traded items, thus the sum of proposed categories does not always sum 
up to 100 per cent. 
Source: UN ComTrade; authors’ calculations on the basis of Multilateral Trade Negotiations categories (WTO). 
Figure 12: 
















































































































Source: UN ComTrade; authors’ calculations. 
Ukraine exports to the EU-25 metals (in-
cluding ores), fuel,31 crude materials, and agro-
food products. Around 20 per cent of these pro-
ducts are raw materials, other 30 per cent are 
semi-processed goods, and the rest are final 
products (Table 3 and Figure 12). Although the 
structure of Ukraine’s exports to the EU approxi-
mately corresponds to the general structure of the 
country’s exports, Ukraine still supplies to the 
EU-25 relatively more fuels and relatively less 
metals (manufactured products). The latter could 
____________________ 
31  Exports of fuel have recently intensified, linked to 
Russia’s investments in Ukraine’s petroleum refinery plants 
that were built in the Soviet Union time for processing 
Russian oil. 
be explained by the structure of the EU protec-
tionism, especially in relation to trade of metals. 
Although Ukraine is a beneficiary under the 
EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP), iron 
and steel are excluded from this scheme, thus are 
subject to the MFN tariff rate. Moreover, quotas 
established by the EU further restrict the supply 
of Ukraine’s metal products. However, despite 
the high protection of the EU market of agro-
food products reflected in the limited GSP 
preferences, the exemption of selected products 
from the GSP for Ukraine, as well as in the intro-
duction of quotas in grain trade, the share of 
Ukraine’s exports of these products to the EU 
 26 
Figure13:  



















































































































Source: UN ComTrade; authors’ calculations. 
Table4:  
Structure of Ukraine’s Imports by the Level of Processing in 1996 and 2002 (per cent)a 
  EU-25 EU-15  NMS  Russia 
  1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996  2002 
Raw  materials  11 4 5 4  21 7  66 66 
Semi-processed  products  17 23 17 22 17 24 10  11 
Final  goods  69 69 73 70 61 69 25  23 
aApplied methodology does not allow classifying all traded items, thus the sum of proposed categories does not always sum
up to 100 per cent. 
Source: UN ComTrade; authors’ calculations on the basis of Multilateral Trade Negotiations categories (WTO). 
market is quite similar to the share of agro-food 
products in its total trade. 
Machinery and equipment, in particular rail-
way tank cars and gas turbines, occupy the larg-
est share of Ukraine’s exports to Russia, fol-
lowed by metals and food products. Thus, the 
level of aggregated value of Ukraine’s eastward 
exports is higher: the share of raw materials is 
only 3 per cent, while the share of final products 
is 66 per cent. Still, this structure of trade exists 
to a large extent not because of competitive ad-
vantage of Ukraine’s machinery, but because of 
the preservation of Soviet Union links. Russia 
purchases in Ukraine machines and equipment 
serving as spare parts for capacities that were in-
stalled in the country during the Soviet Union 
period. 
The structure of Ukraine’s imports from the 
EU-25 and Russia to a certain extent mirrors the 
structure of exports (Figure 13). Imports from 
Russia are dominated by oil and gas, that is, raw 
materials, while imports from the EU-25 is 
mostly final goods, first and foremost machinery 
and equipment (Table 4).  
The structure of trade by factor intensity, as 
shown in Tables 5 and 6, supports the previous 
story. Indeed, Ukraine exports to the EU-25 raw 
material-intensive products (mainly fuel and 
agro-food products), while one-third of its ex-
ports to Russia are of capital goods. In imports 27 
the situation is just the opposite: Ukraine imports 
capital-intensive goods from the EU-25, and raw 
material-intensive goods from Russia. 
The study of Ukraine’s competitive position in 
world trade on the basis of the revealed com-
parative advantage index (RCA)32 shows that 
Ukraine has a comparative advantage in metals, 
agro-food products, including vegetable and 
animal oils and fats, and inedible crude materials 
(Table 7). Ukraine has still a small comparative 
advantage in chemical products. Exports of these 
products face more trade restrictions in the case 
of the EU market (anti-dumping cases against 
metal and chemical products, limitations of the 
GSP scheme, etc.) than in the case of Russia’s 
markets. Although Ukraine also meets these anti-
dumping and safeguard measures against 
Ukraine’s metals and other products, the existing 
free trade agreement and similar trade regula-
tions inherited from the past and still partially 
functioning make Russia’s markets more open 
than the EU’s markets.33 
By factor intensity, Ukraine has a comparative 
advantage in exports of capital-, labour- and raw 
material-intensive goods, while no advantage in 
research-oriented goods (Table 8). 
Summarizing the above discussion, Ukraine 
depends on Russia’s fuels and the EU-25 ma-
chinery and equipment. The former is a heritage 
of the Soviet Union, and the extremely ineffi-
cient structure of energy consumption in the 
country makes Ukraine—a net importer of energy 
products—the most energy-consuming economy 
in the region. The introduction of energy-saving 
technologies as well as the diversification of 
energy suppliers and types of energy used is 
expected to reduce Ukraine’s dependence upon 
Russia. 
In terms of exports, the EU markets seem po-
tentially much more attractive, being the largest 
neighbour market both in terms of population 
and GDP. Moreover, they are more demanding, 
thus increasing export shares in these markets 
will mean meeting very high demand standards, 
____________________ 
32 Calculated as a ratio of sector shares in Ukraine’s and 
world exports. 
33 Even so, of the two bilateral trades, Ukraine derives sur-
pluses on its trade with the EU, but not on its trade with 
Russia. 
allowing entering other world markets with a 
considerable markup for quality. However, 
Russia’s markets are still relevant for Ukraine. 
As the trade regime of the EU towards Russia is 
rather liberal, there is no contradiction between 
the aim of preserving the access to Russian mar-
kets and EU accession. 
Another indicator of regional integration is 
capital movements between the regions con-
cerned and, in particular, flows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Despite all the benefits FDI 
may bring to a transition economy, Ukraine 
failed to attract a significant amount of capital 
from abroad. The comparison of FDI volumes 
per capita across “transition” economies reported 
in Figure 14 shows that Ukraine is at the end of 
the list, surpassing only four countries. Although 
the country has managed to reach a relatively 
high level of economic development without sub-
stantial FDI, much of current economic growth is 
caused by an extremely favourable situation in 
world markets for the main Ukrainian export 
items. Thus, without new driving forces, growth 
may slow down as soon as world market con-
juncture changes for worse. Numerous benefits 
for economic development brought by FDI such 
as technological upgrade, management improve-
ment, know-how, and others may help sustaining 
current economic growth and promote regional 
integration. 
Considering the origin of foreign investors 
present in Ukraine, we can distinguish four groups 
of countries. The European Union is by far the 
largest investor, with more than one-third of total 
FDI inflow (just for the EU-15, so the actual 
number is higher).34 It is followed by the United 
States, a set of so-called “offshore zones” (Cyprus, 
an EU-25 member, and the Virgin Island, a British 
dependency), and CIS countries, mainly Russia 
(Figure 15). Altogether these four groups account 
for three-quarters of total FDI inflows. 
____________________ 
34 The figure of FDI flows from the EU-25 is not reported, 
since the enlarged Europe includes one very large offshore 
zone, Cyprus, that accounts for a substantial part of FDI into 
Ukraine. It is difficult to identify the true origin of capital 
coming from offshore zones. Potentially, investors of all 
countries (including Ukrainian) may use these regions for 
tax optimization schemes. 28 
Table 5: 
Structure of Ukraine’s Exports by Factor Intensity in 1996 and 2002 (per cent)a 
 EU-25  EU-15  NMS  Russia 
  1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 
Capital  goods  36 34 33 32 42 40 55 55 
Labour-intensive  goods  12 18 18 20  5 14  7 12 
Raw  material-intensive  goods  43 40 38 40 50 40 29 25 
aApplied methodology does not allow classifying all traded items, thus the sum of proposed categories does not always sum
up to 100 per cent. 
Source: UN ComTrade; classification from Yilmaz and Ergun (2003); authors’ calculations. 
Table 6: 
Structure of Ukraine’s Imports by Factor Intensity in 1996 and 2002 (per cent)a 
 EU-25  EU-15  NMS  Russia 
  1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 
Capital  Goods  46 58 52 60 35 47 22 24 
Labour-intensive  goods  21 25 20 23 24 29  4  5 
Raw  material-intensive  goods  22 9 15 6 36  17  72  69 
aApplied methodology does not allow classifying all traded items, thus the sum of proposed categories does not always sum
up to 100 per cent. 
Source: UN ComTrade; classification from Yilmaz and Ergun (2003); authors’ calculations. 
Table 7: 
Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCA) for Ukraine, 1996–2002a 
    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
0  Food and live animals  2.1 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.8 
1  Beverages and tobacco  1.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except  fuels  2.5 3.2 4.0 3.8 4.1 3.0 2.7 
3  Fuels, lubricants, etc.   0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.1 
4  Animal, veg. oils, fats, wax  2.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 5.3 4.4 4.7 
5  Chemicals, related products   1.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 
6 Manufactured  goods  2.4  2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.0 
7  Machines, transport equipment  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
8  Misc. manufactured articles  0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
9  Goods not classified by kind  0.4 0.8 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.5 
aThe RCA index ranges from 0 to infinity with 1 denoting the neutral position. 
Source: UN ComTrade; authors’ calculations. 
Table 8: 
Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCA) for Ukraine by Factor Intensity, 1996–2002 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital-intensive goods  3.2  3.3 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 
Labour-intensive goods  1.4  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 
Raw material-intensive goods  1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Source: UN ComTrade; classification from Yilmaz and Ergun (2003); authors’ calculations. 29 
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Source: EBRD (1999, 2003); authors’ calculations. 
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Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 
Capital coming to Ukraine from the west and 
from the east differs not only by volume, but also 
by investment motives and distribution of funds 
across industries. According to the survey re-
sults, conducted by Flemings/SARS Consortium, 
the main motive for western companies operating 
in Ukraine was the possibility to access a large 
domestic market (International Centre for Policy 
Studies 2000). Indeed, with its 48 million in-
habitants, Ukraine represents one of the biggest 
markets in Europe, which, in addition, has a 
good potential for growth in terms of purchasing 
power. Relatively low labour costs are also re-
ported as one of the motives for investment; 
however, this advantage is diminished by low 
productivity. On the contrary, investors from 
Russia and CIS came to Ukraine to regain lost 
markets and re-establish production links that had 
been formed during the Soviet era (Mankovska 
2001). 30 
Table 9: 
Sectoral Distribution of FDI from EU-15 and Russia, 2003 
 EU-15  Russia 
  USD m  %  USD m  % 
All  sectors    2,383.4   100.0   377.7   100.0 
Agriculture   61.6   2.6    5.9   1.6 
Industry  (A+B+C)    1,340.2   56.2   159.4  42.2 
(A)  Mining   32.7   1.4    1.1   0.3 
(B)  Manufacturing    1,297.0   54.4   158.3  41.9 
Food industry    581.0    24.4    10.6    2.8 
Light  industry   55.0   2.3    0.1   0.0 
Wood-processing   45.2   1.9    0.5   0.1 
Publishing   73.0   3.1    0.8   0.2 
Coke and refined oil products   10.2    0.4    103.7    27.5 
Chemical industry    141.1   5.9   0.6   0.2 
Other non-metallic mineral  products    109.4   4.6    2.3   0.6 
Metallurgy and metal processing   46.0   1.9   20.0   5.3 
Machine  building    205.0   8.6    8.5   2.3 
Other   29.5   1.2   11.1   2.9 










Construction   50.3   2.1   14.7   3.9 
Wholesale & retail trade    373.3    15.7    26.9    7.1 
Hotels and restaurants   24.9   1.0    6.3   1.7 
Transport and telecommunications   174.9    7.3    39.4    10.4 
Finance    186.1   7.8   28.5   7.5 
Real  estate    108.1   4.5   17.3   4.6 
Education    1.2   0.1    0.0   0.0 
Healthcare   5.2    0.2    77.9    20.6 
Other community, social, and personal  service   57.6   2.4    1.4   0.4 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 
FDI originated from different regions goes 
into different industries. As shown in Table 9, 
recipients of funds from Europe are mostly com-
panies operating in food, chemical, and machine 
building industries. The wholesale and retail trade 
sectors have also received a significant part of the 
funds from the EU. At the same time, Russian 
capital is concentrated in the fuel and energy 
sector. To take a practical example, Russian oil 
companies have acquired almost all Ukrainian oil 
refineries, which in Soviet Union times were 
constructed specifically for processing Russian 
oil. Another object of interest for investors from 
the “northern neighbour” were healthcare com-
plexes in the region of Crimea. 
Stronger production links between Ukrainian 
and Russian enterprises in certain sectors would 
be beneficial for both countries. However, capital 
from the more advanced economies of the EU 
can bring benefits that are more relevant for the 
long-run growth and development of the Ukrainian 
economy. Factors such as new production, man-
agement and marketing technologies, better la-
bour skills, improvement in risk management, 
etc. are linked to EU FDI and make firms more 
competitive and productive. Another important 
factor is that western companies tend to better 
comply with international standards of environ-
mental protection. Thus, it would be advisable 
for the Ukrainian government to make efforts 
towards attracting more capital from the west. 
After the 2004 elections, Ukraine finds itself 
in an extremely favourable position to attract 
foreign investors from advanced economies, as 
they are interested in an economy that has a large 
domestic market, low labour costs, and a poten-31 
tial to make considerable progress in market re-
forms. While the old member states of the EU 
are expected to be the main source of foreign 
capital flows into Ukraine, some funds may 
come from the NMS as well, as they are gradu-
ally losing their low labour cost comparative ad-
vantage as a result of economic convergence. 
Thus, increasing wages are likely to push in-
vestment further to the east (Economist Corpo-
rate Network 2002). 
Despite its increasing attractiveness, Ukraine 
is not likely to be able to obtain more investment 
from abroad and, accordingly, promote its re-
gional integration, unless the numerous state-
ments about Ukrainian economic potential are 
supported by the practical implementation of re-
forms, specifically of those intended to eliminate 
major impediments that foreign firms face there. 
As indicated in the previous section, among them 
are instability of regulation, ambiguity of the 
legal system, discriminatory regulation, corrup-
tion, and the high tax burden (International Cen-
tre for Policy Studies 2000), unpredictability of 
the tax system, poor protection of rights of mi-
nority shareholders, ineffective bankruptcy pro-
cedure, and other impediments (European Busi-
ness Association 2004). 
5  The Road Ahead: “Tak dalshe 
zhit’ nelzya”35. Initial Per-
spectives under Yushchenko’s 
Government 
So far, the development of the EU–Ukraine rela-
tionship can be split into two stages. The first 
stage, under the Kuchma governments, was char-
acterized by a multiplicity of official documents 
declaring Ukraine’s desire to move towards the 
EU, but little practical steps in this direction. 
There were a lot of complaints from the Ukrain-
ian side that “the EU does not want to give a 
positive political signal by acknowledging the 
possibility of Ukraine’s membership in the EU 
and readiness to start talks on this subject” as 
____________________ 
35 “We cannot go on living like this.” 
well as fears that the EU enlargement would re-
sult in negative consequences for Ukraine (fears 
so far disproved by the facts). In addition, actions 
like the agreement on Single Economic Space 
(SES) have raised doubts that Ukraine is seri-
ously determined to move towards the EU. Fur-
ther, they did not contribute to improving 
Ukraine’s international reputation as a predict-
able and responsible partner. It should be ac-
knowledged, however, that during Kuchma’s 
Presidency a more or less coherent background 
for EU–Ukraine relations was at least formally 
established. 
The 2004 Presidential elections can be consid-
ered as a turning point in Ukraine–EU relation-
ships and the beginning of the second develop-
ment stage. Many EU countries (including the 
NMS) actively participated in the settlement of 
the political crisis in Ukraine and explicitly 
demonstrated their support to Yushchenko as a 
new President. From his part, immediately after 
being sworn into office, he undertook an ex-
tensive foreign tour to Europe. He visited Euro-
pean institutions in Strasbourg and Warsaw, as 
well as World Economic Forum in Davos, ac-
tively mending international relations that were 
in stagnation for almost a decade. Definitely, 
Yushchenko is a more welcomed guest in the 
west than Kuchma was and, thus, can benefit 
from a more positive international environment. 
Nevertheless, there are still questions whether 
Yushchenko will transform the international trust 
he enjoys now into some more or less practical 
proposals from the EU side. 
On February 4, 2005, Ukraine’s Parliament 
voted for the new government headed by Yulia 
Timoshenko, and for the new Programme of the 
Cabinet of Ministers (“Towards People”) that 
formulates the main strategic goals and direc-
tions of the government’s activities, including its 
foreign policies’ priorities.36 While in many as-
pects the relevant programme provisions are 
very close to the intentions declared during the 
Kuchma period (Box 1), it contains one im-
portant element, an explicit intention “to develop 
together with  the EU  a new strategy  of Ukraine– 
____________________ 
36 http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id
=11639687&cat_id=60142 (in Ukrainian). 32 
Box 1: 
Ukraine’s Movement towards EU: Basic Official Documents 
(I)  The European choice: Annual Presidential Address to the Parliament “On the Internal and 
External State of Ukraine”, May 31, 2002 
  According to the Address, Ukraine’s gaining membership with the EU is a prospective foreign 
policy goal. Strategy for achieving this goal is the following: 
  2003–2004 : Ukraine is to sign an associated membership agreement with the EU and conduct 
talks on a free trade zone; 
  2004–2007 : Ukraine is to follow all necessary procedures needed to implement the associated 
membership agreement and become an associated member of the EU;  
  2005–2007 : Ukraine is to set up a customs union with the EU;  
  2007–2011 : Ukraine is to meet all the requirements for EU membership. 
(II)  Law “On National Program of Ukraine’s Legislation Approximation to that of the EU”, March 
18, 2004. 
  According to the law, the adaptation of legislation is defined as the “process of bringing 
Ukrainian laws and other regulatory acts into compliance with “acquis communautaire”. 
Chapter III of the Law explicitly states: “the state policy regarding adaptation of the legislation 
shall be formulated as a component of law reform in Ukraine”. The Law also states “that draft 
Laws of Ukraine and drafts of other legislative acts, relating to the fields of legal relations 
regulated by the law of European Union, are subject to mandatory expertise to determine 
whether this draft comply with “acquis communautaire”. 
  The Law confirms that the priority fields of legal approximation are those defined by the 
Article 51 of PCA: customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, 
intellectual property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on 
competition, public procurement, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, 
the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, nuclear 
laws and regulations, transport. This list shows that if implemented efficiently the process of 
legal approximation will result in substantial improvement of Ukraine’s legal business 
environment and will contribute to integration of Ukraine into European legal space. 
(III) Statement of the Ukrainian Party in Connection with Signing of the Protocol On accession of 
the New EU Member States to the PCA, April 29, 2004. 
  The Ukrainian Side expects that the dialogue with EU concerning enlargement issues will 
continue after May 1, 2004 and will concentrate on the following important issues of Ukraine–
EU relations: granting Ukraine a full market economy status in the framework of the EU 
antidumping legislation; increase of the Ukrainian steel exports to the enlarged EU taking into 
account traditional steel exports to the 10 New Member States; granting Ukraine “social” 
preferences in the framework of the EU GSP; reaching settlement on the modalities of access 
of Ukrainian agricultural products to the EU market; ensuring significant simplification of the 
visa regime between Ukraine and the EU.a 
aStatement of the Urkainian Party in Connection with Signing the Protocol On Accession of the 
New EU Member States to the PCA, April 29, 2004. 
EU relationship that would envisage prospects of 
Ukraine’s membership in the EU; to work in 
order to extend separate elements of pre-acces-
sion EU strategy to Ukraine”. In addition, in the 
new government the special position of a Vice 
Prime Minister on European Integration (Oleg 
Rybachuk) was created, who is supposed to be 
responsible for the implementation of the “Euro-
pean course” of Ukraine. However, the scope of 
his responsibilities as well as the political role in 33 
the process of Ukraine’s regional integration has 
remained unclear so far. 
As indicated in Section 2, Ukraine’s EU 
membership is likely to be a long-run process, 
though the new Ukrainian leadership is very op-
timistic regarding the timing of accession.37 
Definitely Ukraine needs to elaborate a prag-
matic approach to its relations with the EU in the 
post-enlargement period, in terms of expectations 
and possibilities, but also eliminate the impres-
sion that it is wavering undecided between the 
EU and the CIS. At the current stage the ideal 
European strategy for Ukraine would incorporate 
the following elements: 
•  Reconsidering the numerous programmes and 
other documents inherited from the Kuchma 
governance in order to identify real priorities; 
• Harmonizing Ukraine’s legislation with EU 
law; 
If implemented effectively, the process of legal 
approximation will result in a substantial im-
provement of Ukraine’s legal business environ-
ment and will contribute to integrate Ukraine 
into the European legal space. Currently Ukraine 
has more chances to speed up the harmonization 
process, since the struggle among its ruling 
groups is over and the Ukrainian Parliament is 
ready to cooperate with the new Cabinet of 
Ministers. At the same time there are grounds to 
believe that EU will put more emphasis on the 
issue of harmonization. 
• Undertaking steps to get a market economy 
status from the EU; 
As noted in a previous section, the receipt of 
market economy status by Ukraine is hampered 
by such domestic policy problems as inefficient 
bankruptcy legislation and state interventions in 
the price setting mechanism. The new govern-
ment announced its intentions to overcome all 
obstacles and receive a market economy status 
____________________ 
37 According to Boris Tarasyuk, minister of foreign rela-
tions of Ukraine, in the case Ukraine successfully completes 
reforms envisaged in Ukraine–EU Action Plan, in 2007 
Ukraine will be able to sign a “new-level” agreement with 
the EU that allows the country to look for a full EU mem-
bership in approximately 7 years. Ideally, according to Mr. 
Tarasyuk, a new bilateral document between Ukraine and 
the EU should be in the form of a “Europe Agreement or 
Association Agreement”. 
this year. It is expected that the election of Viktor 
Yushchenko to the presidency will allow the EU 
to grant market economy status to Ukraine, as 
the new government resolves the EU’s out-
standing concerns. 
•  Accessing the WTO; 
After more than a decade of negotiations upon 
Ukraine’s WTO membership, it seems that the 
country is approaching the conclusion of the 
talks. As of February 2005, Ukraine signed 30 
bilateral protocols on access to markets of goods 
and services, including protocols with such key 
partners as the EU, Canada, and Turkey. Ac-
cording to the Ministry of Economy and Euro-
pean Integration, Ukraine has agreed upon 95 per 
cent of all tariff lines, excluding tariffs on sensi-
tive Ukrainian products (first of all, in agricul-
ture). Also, talks on access to service markets is 
completed for 98 per cent of all service catego-
ries as defined by the WTO classification. 
Ukraine continues negotiations concerning ac-
cess to financial and audiovisual services mar-
kets. 
However, for the successful completion of the 
negotiation process in the near future, Ukraine 
has to fulfill several tasks. First, Ukraine has to 
sign bilateral protocols with the USA, Japan, 
China, Norway, Australia, and several other 
countries. It is expected that a successful conclu-
sion of negotiations with the USA (as Ukraine 
and the EU have already signed a bilateral proto-
col for market access in goods and services in the 
framework of Ukraine’s WTO accession) will 
intensify the overall process of signing bilateral 
agreements. Second, Ukraine has to complete 
multilateral talks and to finalize a Working Party 
Report. For this, Ukraine has to harmonize na-
tional legislations in accordance with the WTO 
requirements. Unsettled questions include har-
monization of technical regulation; simplification 
of certification procedure; harmonization of 
sanitary, phyto-sanitary and veterinary measures; 
custom valuation; subsidies in car industry; ex-
port tariffs; quotas on exports and imports of 
sugar; estimation of agricultural domestic sup-
port. 
Some Ukrainian officials forecast that Ukraine’s 
increased coordination of activities between the 34 
Government and the Parliament will allow com-
pleting harmonization of national legislation and 
bilateral talks in the first half of 2005. Shall these 
hopes come true, Ukraine might be able to be-
come a WTO member in December 2005 during 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. 
•  Preparing an agreement concerning the estab-
lishment of an FTA with the EU; 
Although the PCA envisages the prospect of es-
tablishing a free trade area (FTA) with the EU as 
an “evolutionary” clause, so far no agenda for 
the fulfillment of this clause has been deter-
mined. The main requirement by the EU is that 
Ukraine becomes a WTO member before estab-
lishing an FTA with the EU. Thus, while for 
most of the NMS the fulfillment of WTO mem-
bership conditions was a by-product of the EU 
accession process, for Ukraine the WTO mem-
bership is a step towards EU integration. 
It is worthwhile noting that the programme of 
government’s activities entitled “Towards People” 
explicitly declares Ukraine’s intention “to launch 
jointly with the EU work aimed at establishing a 
free trade area”. Such negotiations, if seriously 
taken by both sides, could become an external 
anchor for internal institutional reforms. 
Finally, it should not be overlooked that Russia 
and other CIS countries remain important eco-
nomic partners for Ukraine. Therefore, it would be 
advisable for the country to preserve relationships 
with its eastern neighbours. Generally speaking, 
future cooperation between Ukraine and the CIS 
countries will be determined by the following 
factors: 
−  The political and economic agendas of the EU. 
In case Ukraine and the EU fail to find an ap-
propriate “post-enlargement” scheme of bilat-
eral relations, Ukraine may be forced to recon-
sider its European choice and come closer to 
Russia. At the same time a lot will depend 
upon how the EU will assess the integration 
prospects of Ukraine; 
−  The speed and scale of the continued trade re-
orientation away from the CIS space to third, 
mainly EU markets; 
−  The increase in FDI inflows from the enlarged 
EU; 
−  Ukrainian attempts to secure its positions on 
the CIS markets. 
In sum, from Ukraine’s perspective the way 
ahead in relations with the EU has two dimen-
sions: economic and institutional. Success in the 
economic dimension will depend upon Ukraine’s 
ability to penetrate more deeply into EU markets, 
to receive a greater share of EU FDI, and to com-
pete successfully with EU companies. This abil-
ity will be determined, to the largest extent, by a 
domestic policy that should ensure the estab-
lishment of a viable market economy. Further 
developments in the institutional dimension will 
depend upon improving the framework of co-
operation and removing obstacles in mutual eco-
nomic relations. 
This will also depend upon a clear decision 
from the Ukrainian side concerning its remaining 
relations with the CIS and prospective initiatives 
like the SES. A commitment towards the EU will 
necessarily imply a choice towards it, with all its 
rules and obligations. Relations with the CIS will 
not be severed, but Ukraine must realize that it 
will not be able to remain a member of this or-
ganization or of other sorts of regional groupings 
if those contradict the conditions for EU mem-
bership.38 
This seemingly Ukrainian indecision between 
CIS and the EU was dispelled by a series of high 
level bilateral EU–Ukraine meetings held during 
February 2005: starting with the visit by EU Ex-
ternal Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
to Kiev during 16–18 February and followed by 
the 8
th meeting of the EU–Ukraine Cooperation 
Council, held in Brussels on 21 February 2005, 
when the EU welcomed the appointment of a 
new government and expressed support for its 
programme of political and economic reforms. 
At this meeting, the EU formally acknowledged 
Ukraine’s European ambitions and made clear 
that a new commitment to democracy and re-
forms opened new prospects for EU–Ukraine 
relations, and presented additional measures 
agreed by the European Council in order to 
____________________ 
38 One must stress here that, in spite of some proposals, the 
EU is not a “pick and choose” structure, and that there is no 
such halfway house towards membership. One is either in-
side the EU or not. 35 
strengthen the Action Plan, some of which are 
listed below (one must note that they do in-
corporate many of the elements described above 
as the “ideal European strategy for Ukraine”): 
•  To initiate early consultations on an enhanced 
agreement between the EU and Ukraine, to re-
place the PCA at the end of its initial ten-year 
period; 
•  To explore possibilities for closer co-operation 
in the area of foreign and security policy, in-
cluding European Security Defence Policy. 
Ukraine should be invited, on a case-by-case 
basis, to align itself with EU positions on re-
gional and international issues; 
•  To deepen trade and economic relations be-
tween the EU and Ukraine. Work on agree-
ments for steel and textile products for 2005 
will be intensified. The review of the existing 
feasibility study on establishing an FTA be-
tween Ukraine and the EU will be accelerated 
with a view to enable an early start of nego-
tiations once Ukraine has joined the WTO; 
•  To lend further support to Ukraine’s WTO ac-
cession and to offer Ukraine continued assis-
tance in meeting the necessary requirements; 
•  To grant ‘Market Economy Status’ to Ukraine, 
as soon as the limited remaining issues have 
been satisfactorily resolved. The EU will in-
tensify contacts with Ukraine in order to re-
solve theses issues; 
•  To step up support to the process of legislative 
approximation, including technical assistance 
and twinning to meet EU norms and standards 
and targeted advice and support legislative ap-
proximation through a mechanism such as the 
Technical Assistance and Information Ex-
change (TAIEX) unit of the Enlargement DG 
of the European Commission. Further efforts 
will be made to conclude bilateral agreements 
on the co-ordination of social security; 
•  To maximize access to funding from the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB). After final en-
dorsement of the ENP Action Plan, up to 250 
million euros of EIB lending could be made 
available to Ukraine; 
• To provide increased assistance to Ukraine 
through the relevant instruments in order to 
help Ukraine to pursue the reform process. 
The culmination of those meetings happened 
on February 23, 2005, when the new Ukrainian 
President made a speech entitled “Ukraine’s 
Future is in the EU” at the European Parliament, 
in which a clear vision for EU membership was 
expressed, with his statement that “We hope that 
at the end of the Action Plan, in 2007, we will be 
in a position to begin EU membership negotia-
tions. Ukraine is already a part of an integrated 
Europe. We are able to make an application un-
der Article 49 and will aim to meet the Copen-
hagen criteria”, received with a standing ovation 
by the Parliament. In the same speech, he also 
stressed the non-exclusive nature of Ukraine’s 
EU links, by saying that “Moving closer to 
Europe does not prevent closer cooperation with 
Russia. Ukraine’s membership of the EU and 
NATO is not against Russian interests—on the 
contrary, a stable Ukraine could help bring Rus-
sia closer to Europe”. After this speech, Presi-
dent Yushchenko met in Brussels with the EU’s 
Council Secretary General, Javier Solana. These 
meetings happened one day after his visit to the 
NATO headquarters in Brussels, once again 
stressing the already existing links between this 
organization and Ukraine, and also opening the 
doors for a future NATO membership for 
Ukraine. 
6 Conclusions 
Under Yushchenko, Ukraine has an opportunity 
to engage in a series of reforms, including con-
cerning its relations with the EU. Ukraine has 
experienced a remarkable macroeconomic stabi-
lization and growth resumption in the last few 
years. Using relative institutional and economic 
indicators, the remaining deficits are obvious 
when compared to other countries in the queue 
for EU membership, but the case of other appli-
cant countries, e.g., Croatia, has shown that in-
stitutional reforms can be quite fast, when sup-
ported by a clear EU entry perspective. Given the 
current economic links with the EU, Ukraine’s 
largest partner, the potential gains for Ukraine 
from membership are very substantial. 36 
Ukraine should press for fast reforms and use 
the “honeymoon” period of the new government 
to open negotiations for EU membership, by sub-
mitting a formal application. This will, among 
other things, help to prevent a state recapture by 
vested interest groups and the further blocking of 
reforms. Nevertheless, EU membership is a long-
term effort, and the Ukraine government should be 
aware of that. 
The Ukrainian government should expect an 
initially sceptic reaction from some member 
states at the Council and also from the European 
Commission, as historically these institutions 
were sceptical about all previous enlargements. 
The New EU Member States and the European 
Parliament shall prove to be important allies for 
Ukraine in the application/negotiation process. 
The EU, on its side, should weigh Ukraine’s 
application on its merits, not taking into consid-
eration the concerns of non-EU countries. To as-
sure the successful achievement of Ukrainian 
membership, the EU should actively support the 
continuation of the reform process in the country, 
especially with respect to institution building. 
Finally, one must stress that the EU itself shall 
gain from this enlargement, as it has gained from 
all the previous ones. 
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